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During the COVID-19 lockdown the initial British Government mantra of ‘Stay home. 
Protect the NHS. Save Lives’, the ritualistic weekly public clapping for the NHS and the 
overall tone of the media coverage led several commentators to raise the question of whether 
the NHS had become a religion.2 This question is legally significant. English law provides the 
right to manifest religion or belief under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the right not to be 
discriminated against on grounds of religion or belief in relation to employment and the 
provision of goods and services under the Equality Act 2010.  This raises the point: during 
the lifting of lockdown when authorities require people to go back to their workplace or send 
their children to school, could individuals who refuse say they were legally entitled to decline 
on the basis that such a requirement breached their belief in protecting the NHS? 
 
This brief comment explores whether such an argument could be made.  A belief in 
protecting the NHS would potentially fall under the definition of belief rather than religion. 
There is confused and contradictory case law on the meaning of belief for the purpose of 
religion or belief discrimination law.3  This is underscored by four recent cases. The first two 
are contradictory decisions on vegetarianism and veganism: the decision in Conisbee 4that a 
 
1 I am grateful to Frank Cranmer, Dr Sharon Thompson and Dr Caroline Roberts for their comments on an 
earlier draft of this comment.  
2See N Spencer, ‘Clapping for the NHS, our New Religion’ THEOS 
<https://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/comment/2020/03/27/clapping-for-the-nhs-our-new-religion> and L 
Woodhead, ‘The NHS, Our National Religion’ Religion Media Centre  
<https://religionmediacentre.org.uk/news-comment/the-nhs-our-national-religion-2/> Such an analogy is not 
new and was famously used by Nigel Lawson in his memoirs. The British Medical Journal featured an editorial 
on the topic in 1999 (J Neuberger, ‘The NHS as a Theological Institution’ (1999) 319 BMJ 1588) and the NHS 
had a starring role in the Opening Ceremony of the Olympics in 2012. A study into the Cultural History of the 
NHS by Warwick University is exploring how people believe in the NHS  
<https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/history/chm/research/current/nhshistory>  The analogy has been used by 
commentators both to praise and to criticise the NHS (P Toynbee, ‘The NHS is our Religion: It’s the only thing 
that saves it from the Tories’<https://amp.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/03/nhs-religion-tories-
health-service> cf. B Spencer, ‘The NHS is the Closest Thing we have to a Religion – and that's why it must be 
privatised’<https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/nhs-crisis-jeremy-hunt-health-service-religion-privatise-to-
save-it-a7567056.html> Perhaps most notably, the then Health Secretary  Jeremy Hunt is reported to have said 
that the treatment of the NHS as a ‘national religion’ meant that anyone who questioned its orthodoxy could be 
left ‘facing the Spanish inquisition’. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/nhs/11744633/NHS-reforms-are-like-
the-Reformation-of-the-church-says-Jeremy-Hunt.html>. 
3 See further R Sandberg, ‘Clarifying the Definition of Religion under English Law: The Need for a Universal 
Definition?’ (2018) 20 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 132. 
4Mr G Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd &Or s[2019] ET 3335357/2018. 
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belief in vegetarianism was not capable of being protected,5and the decision by the same 
judge in Casamitjana6 that ethical veganism is a belief that qualifies for protection.7 The 
second two cases concerning beliefs that sex is biologically immutable in Forstater8and 
Mackereth,9 which both held that such beliefs were not protected by the Equality Act 2010.10 
This comment will explore the case law on the definition of belief and the tests that 
Employment Tribunals have used as a whole, collating and comparing to these recent 
decisions as well as paying particular to the decision which is most analogous to the question 
set here, the cases of McEleny11in which it was held that a belief in Scottish independence 
was capable of being protected  and Maistry12in which the Employment Tribunals held (and 
the Court of Appeal13did not challenge) the finding that a belief in public service 
broadcasting was capable of being protected as a belief (though the claim then failed on 
substantive grounds). This comment will explore the preliminary tests that a belief in the 
NHS would need to satisfy in order to be potentially capable of being protected under the 
Equality Act. In so doing, it will become apparent how malleable and therefore unsatisfactory 
the current approach to the definition of belief under discrimination law is. 14 
 
The turning point in the case law on the definition of belief was the decision of the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal in Grainger15which concluded that a belief in man-made 
climate change was capable of constituting a ‘philosophical belief’ because it met the criteria 
laid out by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights which was directly relevant. 
This was important for two reasons.  The first was the EAT’s insistence that the Strasbourg 
case law was to be followed. This was noteworthy because the Equality Act only protects 
 
5 On which see F Cranmer and R Sandberg, ‘A Critique of the Decision in Conisbee that Vegetarianism is not a 
Belief’ (2020) 22 (1) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 36. 
6Casamitjana v The League of Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018.  
7 Compare the earlier decision in Alexander v Farmtastic Valley Ltd and others [2011]  ET 2513832/10 in which 
a belief in the treatment of animals which included vegetarianism and aspects of Buddhism was held to be a 
protected belief.  
8Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors [2019] ET 2200909/2019. 
9Mackereth v The Department for Work and Pensions &Ors [2019]ET 1304602/2018. 
10 On which see A Hambler, ‘Beliefs Unworthy of Respect in a DemocraticSociety: A View from the 
Employment Tribunal’ (2020) 22 (2) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 234. 
11McEleny v Ministry of Defence (Scotland : Disability Discrimination, Religion or Belief Discrimination) 
[2018] UKET 4105347/2017 
12Maistry v The BBC [2011] ET 1213142/2010. 
13 [2014] EWCA Civ 1116. 
14 It is worth noting at the outset that Employment Tribunal decisions are not binding on each other. Much 
depends upon the evidence adduced. 
15Grainger PLC v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219/09/ZT . 
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‘any religious or philosophical belief’16  while the ECHR makes no distinction between 
philosophical or non-philosophical beliefs and has taken an expansive approach even 
considering political beliefs like communism17and Nazism.18 The case law as a whole has 
invariably considered claims without questioning whether such claims fit the definition of 
religion or belief and this suggests that a belief in the NHS would fall under Article 9 
ECHR.19 Grainger suggests that this broad approach is to be taken to domestic equality law.  
 
The second reason why the decision is important is because it provided five tests which 
Employment Tribunal Chairs have subsequently applied these requirements as if they were 
statutory tests.20 As Forstater noted, these five criteria are also expressed in the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission’s Employment Statutory Code of Practice21 and that ‘the 
Tribunal is required to take the code into account where it is relevant but is not bound by it’.22 
Nonetheless, subsequent Employment Tribunal decisions have followed the texts to the 
letter.23 However, some decisions have stressed that ‘the threshold for establishing the 
Grainger criteria should not be set “too high”’.24  The following will therefore explore each 
of the five tests in turn to see how they could be applied to the question of whether a belief in 
the NHS and the need to protect it could constitute a belief for the purposes of the Equality 
Act 2010 (and so interference with that belief could amount to discrimination, harassment 
and / or victimisation).  
 
 
 
 
16 Equality Act 2010 s10.  
17Hazar, Hazar and Acik v Turkey (1991) 72 D&R 200. 
18X v Austria (1981) 26 D&R 89. 
19 There is no case on point of whether a belief in the healthcare system would be protected as a belief but in 
Nyyssönen v Finland[1998] App no 30406/96 (15 January 1998). the European Commission of Human Rights 
held that ‘alternative medicine as a manifestation of medical philosophy falls within the ambit of the right to 
freedom of thought and conscience’.The claim failed because no evidence had been submitted that could lead to 
the conclusion that he was prevented from manifesting his belief. 
20Grainger PLC v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219/09/ZT  at para 24. 
21<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/employercode.pdf> 
22Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 51.  
23 An exception is Conisbee [2019] ET 3335357/2018 where Counsel put forward additional tests but the only 
additional test that the tribunal referenced in its decision was that ‘the belief must have a similar status or 
cogency to religious beliefs’ (para 43). This is questionable given that the word ‘similar’ has been removed from 
the statutory definition of belief under the Equality Act 2010: see the discussion in F Cranmer and R Sandberg,  
‘ACritique of the Decision in Conisbee that  Vegetarianism is not a Belief’ (2020) 22 (1) Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal 36. 
24 E.g., Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 52, citing Harron v Chief Constable of 
Dorset Police[2016] IRLR 481, EAT, para 34.  
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1. The Belief must be Genuinely Held  
 
The first test that the belief must be genuinely held is usually easily met. In Conisbee25 and 
Casamitjana26 this point was conceded by the respondents and accepted by the tribunal. It 
was also accepted in Mackereth27 and Forstater,28which reiterated the principle found in the 
House of Lords decision in Williamson29that this inquiry was limited to considering whether 
the belief is held in good faith.  However, despite Williamson also stating that ‘it is not for the 
court to embark on an inquiry into the asserted belief and judge its “validity” by some 
objective standard such as the source material upon which the claimant founds his belief or 
the orthodox teaching of the religion in question’, a number of employment tribunal decisions 
including Casamitjana30 have said that they have based their finding on the evidence 
submitted.  This is compliant with Williamson if this assessment is based on quantity rather 
than quality.  In Streatfield31 it was held that the Claimant’s humanist beliefs were genuinely 
held because there was evidence she had held these beliefs from an early age and had ‘lived 
her life adopting a general adherence to those principles’. That decision also confirmed that a 
belief would still be treated as genuine even if it was not manifested by the claimant at all 
times. A belief in protecting the NHS, provided that the claim was not made in a vexatious 
way in order to avoid legal obligations, would surely be able to meet the first Grainger test. 
In Maistry32the fact that the belief was ‘of great personal significance’ to the claimant given 
his career and experiences was mentioned as part of Employment Judge Hughes’ finding that 
there was ‘no reason whatsoever to doubt the strength of the claimant’s feelings about this’ 
but it is questionable whether this is to taken as requiring such significance for this test to be 
met in all cases.    
 
 
 
 
25 Mr G Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd &Ors [2019] ET 3335357/2018 para 38. 
26Casamitjana v The League of Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 at para 33. 
27Mackereth v The Department for Work and Pensions &Ors [2019]ET 1304602/2018. 
28Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 53. 
29R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parteWilliamson [2005] UKHL 15 at para 
22. 
30Casamitjana v The League of Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 at para 33. 
31Streatfield v London Philharmonic Orchestra Ltd[2012] 2390772/2011at para 38.  
32Maistry v The BBC [2011] ET 1213142/2010 at para 8. It was also confirmed that the extent to which the 
claimiant had raised the question of belief during capability or greviance proceedings, though relevant to the 
quesiton of liability, did not affect the question of whether the beleif was genuine unless it could be inferred that 
the failureto mention it demonstrated that it was not a genuine belief at all: para 16. 
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2. It must be Belief rather than an Opinion or Viewpoint  
 
The second requirement is that a belief must not be merely an opinion or viewpoint based on 
the present state of information available, but this has been applied in an inconsistent way. 
The requirement originated in McClintock33concerning a Justice of the Peace who resigned 
since he could not in conscience agree to place children with same-sex couples because  he 
felt further research was needed on the effect this would have upon the children. Both the 
Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the claimant’s 
objection did not constitute a belief because he had not as a matter of principle rejected the 
possibility that single sex parents could ever be in the child’s best interest: it was not 
sufficient ‘to have an opinion based on some real or perceived logic or based on information 
or lack of information available’.34 In Farrell v South Yorkshire Police Authority35 it was held 
that this requirement was met since, unlike in McClintock, the claimant had come to a 
conclusion that the evidence pointed one way and not another. The crucial factor was that 
whilst he was prepared to admit that he might be wrong, he did not believe himself to be 
wrong. This was applied in Forstater36where it was accepted that her belief was ‘more than 
an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available’ and that the 
claimant was ‘fixed in it, and appears to be becoming more so’.37 
 
However, in other cases this requirement has been taken further to suggest that even where 
the claimant had reached a settled conclusion this will not be sufficient.  Notably in 
Conisbee38Employment Judge Postle held that this test had not been met because ‘it is simply 
not enough to have an opinion based on some real, or perceived, logic’.39 This refers to the 
first limb of the McClintock test but does not explain why the tribunal found that the belief 
was an opinion or viewpoint rather than a belief capable of protection. Employment Judge 
Postle seems to have posed questions about the validity of belief that Williamson warned 
 
33McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs [2007] UKEAT022307CEA. 
34 At para 54.  
35Farrell v South Yorkshire Police Authority [2011] ET 2803805/2010 at para 6.  
36Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 54.  
37 The point does not seem to be discussed in the judgment inMackereth v The Department for Work and 
Pensions &Ors [2019] ET 1304602/2018. 
38Mr G Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd &Ors [2019] ET 3335357/2018 at para 39.  
39 The reference to ‘an opinion based on some real, or perceived logic’ comes from McClintock v Department of 
Constitutional Affairs [2007] UKEAT022307CEA at para 45 but this does not create a distinction since 
protected beliefs too will be presumably based on a real or perceived logic.  
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against.  This is underlined by his decision in Casamitjana40 that this test had been met 
because ‘ethical veganism carries with it an important moral essential’, ‘is founded on a 
longstanding tradition’ and therefore is ‘not simply a viewpoint, but a real and genuine belief 
and not some irrational opinion’. Such an approach is not only deeply conservative but is 
fundamentally inappropriate: it is not for judges to decide whether beliefs are rational or not 
and to hold that irrational beliefs are mere opinions and so not protected.  It would appear that 
the discussion of this in Conisbee and Casamitjana is a misstatement of the law.  
 
Even allowing for his ambiguity in the case law, it would appear that a belief in protecting the 
NHS could satisfy this second text provided that the claimant’s belief was fixed and not 
dependent on (say) whether the NHS could cope at a particular time. Other decisions have 
stressed that there is a low threshold to satisfying this second test. Grainger41 itself insisted 
that a ‘philosophical belief does not need to amount to an “-ism”’ and Hashman42 confirmed 
that beliefs regarding specific matters can meet this threshold if they form part of a larger 
philosophy: beliefs concerning hunting met this requirement because the Claimant’s beliefs 
were to be ‘considered within the parameters of his general beliefs ... in the sanctity of life’. 
In Maistry43the test was met on the basis of statements about the purpose of public 
broadcasting and the fact that the importance of the independent public space had ‘attracted 
commentary by philosophers and academics’. It is likely that the same conclusion would be 
reached in relation to NHS, on grounds of the importance for public health care and the role 
of the welfare state. It is difficult to imagine an Employment Tribunal chair dismissing a 
belief to protect the NHS as being a mere opinion subject to change. Indeed, in McEleny44the 
tribunal rejected the respondent’s argument that a belief in Scottish independence failed this 
test because all political beliefs were ‘up for debate’ and ‘cannot be held as a matter of 
principle’.  The employment tribunal insisted that the belief was not ‘susceptible to change if 
challenged by empirical evidence’ but was instead ‘unshakeable’ and so the test was met. 45 
 
 
 
40Casamitjana v The League of Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 at para 34.  
41Grainger PLC v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219/09/ZT at para 28.  
42Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Ltd[2011] ET 3105555/2009 (at para 55.  
43Maistry v The BBC [2011] ET 1213142/2010 at para 17.  
44McEleny v Ministry of Defence (Scotland : Disability Discrimination, Religion or Belief Discrimination) 
[2018] UKET 4105347/2017 
45 Para 32.  
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3. It must be a Belief as to a Weighty and Substantial Aspect of Human Life and 
Behaviour 
 
In most cases the third requirement that the belief needs to relate to a weighty and substantial 
aspect of human life and behaviour is easily satisfied.  In Forstater46 it was simply accepted 
while in Grainger47itself it was stated that this did not exclude “one-off “beliefs such as 
pacifism and vegetarianism which do not govern the entirety of a person’s life’. In McEleny48 
it was stated that while it was not necessary for others to share the belief, ‘it must have an 
impact on others’. This does not mean that it needs to affect the whole of humanity: short 
shrift was given to the respondent’s argument that a belief in Scottish independence would 
not ‘extend far beyond Scotland’ meaning that ‘since it had no substantial impact upon the 
lives of citizens in for example Tanzania, Peru or India; it is not a substantial aspect of human 
life or behaviour’.49 
 
Again, the decisions in Conisbee and Casamitjana took a more restrictive approach. In 
Conisbee50 it was concluded that ‘vegetarianism is not about human life and behaviour, it is a 
lifestyle choice.  While this was ‘an admirable sentiment’ it could not ‘altogether be 
described as relating to weight and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour’. By 
contrast, in Casamitjana51 the same Employment Judge concluded that veganism is ‘at its 
heart between the interaction of human and non-human animal life’ and that: ‘The 
relationship between humans and other fellow creatures is plainly a substantial aspect of 
human life, it has sweeping consequences on human behaviour and clearly is capable of 
constituting a belief which seeks to avoid the exploitation of fellow species’. It is difficult, 
however, to see why the same could not be said of vegetarianism and this contradiction 
means that it is difficult to extrapolate points of principle from how these two decisions dealt 
with this test and indeed if it were possible it would be questionable whether such points 
would be legally correct: again, we see Employment Judges entering into questions of 
 
46Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 82. 
47Grainger PLC v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219/09/ZT at para 27.  
48McEleny v Ministry of Defence (Scotland : Disability Discrimination, Religion or Belief Discrimination) 
[2018] UKET 4105347/2017 at para 33. 
49 At para 17.  
50Mr G Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd &Ors [2019] ET 3335357/2018 at para 40.  
51Casamitjana v The League of Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 at para 35.  
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validity and worth. In any case, it is difficult to see how the Conisbee precedent could lead to 
the conclusion that this test is not capable of being met in relation to a belief in the NHS.  By 
contrast, the decision in Maistry seems to suggest that such a belief would satisfy the third 
test. Employment Judge Hughes held that:  
 
‘A belief in the importance of providing a non-commercial, non-Governmental, 
independent public space in which a cultural, social and political tensions can be 
debated and explored and in which tolerance of other viewpoints is fostered, clearly 
relates to weighty and substantial aspects of human life and behaviour.’52 
 
The respondent’s case had been that this test was not met because ‘the legislation could not 
have been intended to cover a belief of this nature because really it was no more than a 
“mission statement”’. 53 The respondent argued that ‘if the claimant was right, then it would 
follow that beliefs in the aims and values of a whole host of public organisations, if genuinely 
held, could amount to philosophical beliefs’.  The example given by the respondent is 
important given the subject matter of this comment: ‘the respondent suggested that a belief 
that the aim of the NHS should first and foremost be to look after the health and welfare of its 
patients could, if the claimants were correct, amount to a belief’. The respondent argued that 
this would be ‘absurd’ but Employment Judge Hughes held that the fact that the public aims 
of an organisation could amount to a philosophical belief if those aims were the results of an 
underlying philosophical belief. For Hughes, that the beliefs ‘might fairly be characterised as 
idealistic in nature and / or as a “mission statement” ... does not negate the evidence before 
me was that those purposes arise because of a shared belief in the importance of public 
service broadcasting in a democratic society’.54  This suggests that a similar belief about 
public healthcare would satisfy the third test.  
 
4. It must attain a Certain Level of Cogency, Seriousness, Cohesion and 
Importance 
 
The requirements of the fourth test that the belief needs to attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance are taken from the human rights jurisprudence. The 
 
52Maistry v The BBC [2011] ET 1213142/2010 at para 18. 
53 Para 9.  
54 Para 18.  
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leading case on this is the Employment Appeal Tribunal decision in Harron55 in which 
Langstaff J confirmed that ‘there is no material difference between the domestic approach 
and that under Article 9’56 and that Lord Nicholls’ speech in Williamson57 is to be followed.  
For Langstaff J, this meant that ‘the belief must relate to matters more than merely trivial’ 
and coherence ‘is to be understood in the sense of being intelligible and capable of being 
understood’.58 This is uncontroversial. However, Langstaff added that ‘where a belief has too 
narrow a focus it may, depending upon the width of that focus, not meet the standards at the 
appropriate level identified’.59 He stated that this followed Lord Nicholls’ rubric that the 
belief needs to be on a fundamental problem: ‘That might be thought to exclude beliefs that 
had so narrow a focus as to be parochial rather than fundamental’. 
 
This has, however, led some Employment Tribunal chairs to conclude that the fourth 
requirement is not met because the belief is ‘parochial’ without explaining why they have 
considered it so and therefore again potentially breaching Williamson by determining the 
validity of the belief. In Lisk60 Employment Judge George held that belief that one should 
wear a poppy to show respect to serviceman failed this test because he would characterise the 
claimant’s belief as ‘a belief that we should express support for the sacrifice of others and not 
as a belief in itself and this was ‘too “narrow” to be characterised as a philosophical belief’.  
Similarly in Mackereth61the Employment Tribunal ran the third and fourth tests together and 
held that, although a belief in Genesis 1.27 and a lack of belief in transgenderism met these 
requirements ‘given the low threshold’, a belief that it would be irresponsible and dishonest 
for (say) a health professional to accommodate and/or encourage a patient’s impersonation of 
the opposite sex did not meet these requirements ‘because of the narrowness of the issue they 
represent’. No further explanation was given.  In Conisbee62 it was held that this test was not 
met because there were ‘numerous, differing and wide varying reasons for adopting 
vegetarianism’ in contrast to veganism. Not only is this monolithic understanding of 
 
55Harron v Chief Constable of Dorset Police [2016] UKEAT/0234/15/DA.  
56 Para33.  
57R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parteWilliamson [2005] UKHL 15 at para 
22. 
58Harron v Chief Constable of Dorset Police [2016] UKEAT/0234/15/DA  at para 34.  
59 Para 37.  
60Lisk v Shield Guardian Co Ltd & Others [2011] ET 3300873/2011. 
61Mackereth v The Department for Work and Pensions &Ors [2019]ET 1304602/2018 at para 195-196. 
62Mr G Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd &Ors [2019] ET 3335357/2018 at para 41.  
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veganism suspect,63 it is questionable whether this is relevant to the question of whether the 
belief is cogent and seriously held. Imposing a requirement that it cannot be too narrow or 
that there needs to be an agreed, singular reason for the belief is far too conservative.64 It also 
raises problematic questions of how this is to be determined by the tribunal. In Farrell65 
Employment Judge Rostant held that some sort of objective assessment of the cogency and 
cohesion of the philosophical belief is expected of the Tribunal. He held that ‘the assessment 
of cogency and coherence must take into account the broadly accepted body of knowledge in 
the public domain’. He held that the test had not been met in the case of the Claimant’s belief 
in conspiracy theories regarding 9/11.  
 
This is difficult, however, to reconcile with the human rights jurisprudence including 
Williamson. Other tribunal decisions have taken a much more lenient approach. In McEleny66 
it was held that this test was met where a belief is taken seriously, ‘is intelligible and capable 
of being understood’.  In Forstater67it was held that the need for coherence ‘mainly requires 
that the belief can be understood’ and that this test would not be failed even when there was 
‘significant scientific evidence that it is wrong’. This is correct: the fourth requirement is 
about how important and serious the belief is to the claimant; it is not concerned with the 
objective question of how important or serious the belief is considered to be.  The fact that, 
objectively, such beliefs are unlikely to be true is irrelevant. Atheists would maintain that all 
religions would fail to meet this test. The type of claim which the fourth test seeks to exclude 
is the deliberate sham religion.68 There is, therefore, no reason why a belief in protecting the 
NHS could not satisfy this requirement. It is notable that this requirement was seen to be 
easily met in Maistry69: ‘a strongly held belief in the purpose of mission statement of their 
public or private sector employer would be protected’.70 
 
63P Edge, ‘Vegetarianism as a protected characteristic: another view on Conisbee’, Law & Religion UK, 21 
September 2019,<http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2019/09/23/vegetarianism-as-a-protectedcharacteristic- 
another-view-on-conisbee/.>. 
64 See also in Casamitjana v The League of Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 at para 37 in which it was 
held that ethical veganism met this test because ‘a community within businesses and restaurants clearly exists 
‘which adheres to this ethical principle’.  
65Farrell v South Yorkshire Police Authority [2011] ET 2803805/2010 at para 6.  
66McEleny v Ministry of Defence (Scotland : Disability Discrimination, Religion or Belief Discrimination) 
[2018] UKET 4105347/2017 at paras 18 and 34. 
67Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 83.  
68An example of such a claim can be found in the US case of United States v Kuch 288 F Supp 439 (1968). 
69Maistry v The BBC [2011] ET 1213142/2010 at para 19.  
70 It was held that the claimant’s belief was not a political belief and even if it was this did not mean that it was 
not protected.  There is a significant and contradictory case law on the issue of whether political beliefs are 
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5. It must be Worthy of Respect in a Democratic Society 
 
The fifth and final requirement is that the belief must be worthy of respect in a democratic 
society, be compatible with human dignity and not in conflict with the fundamental rights of 
others.’71   Beliefs will meet this threshold unless they abuse the rights of others.  As 
Baroness Hale noted in Williamson72:  ‘A free and plural society must expect to tolerate all 
sorts of views which many, even most, find completely unacceptable’.73 In 
Conisbee,74Casamitjana, 75McEleny76 and Maistry77it was readily accepted that this condition 
had been met. Indeed, in the case law to date there are mostly only hypothetical examples of 
when this test would not be met. Lord Nicholls in Williamson gave the example of beliefs 
‘involved subjecting others to torture or inhuman punishment would not qualify for 
protection’;78 while in Grainger79 it was suggested ‘a racist or homophobic political 
philosophy’ would be excluded.  
 
However, Mackereth80and Forstater81 now provide an actual example of this test being 
failed.  In Mackereth82a belief in Genesis 1.27, a lack of belief in transgenderism and a belief 
that it would be irresponsible and dishonest for (say) a health professional to accommodate 
and/or encourage a patient’s impersonation of the opposite sex were all held to be 
‘incompatible with human dignity and conflict with the fundamental rights of others, 
specifically here, transgender individuals’. 83 Similarly in Forstater84 Employment Judge 
 
protected under the Equality Act: see R Sandberg, ‘Are Political Beliefs Religious Now?’(2015) 175 Law and 
Justice 180. 
71 At para 24.   
72R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parteWilliamson[2005] UKHL 15. 
73 Para 77. 
74Mr G Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd &Ors [2019] ET 3335357/2018 at para 42  
75Casamitjana v The League of Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 at para 38.  
76McEleny v Ministry of Defence (Scotland : Disability Discrimination, Religion or Belief Discrimination) 
[2018] UKET 4105347/2017 at para 35.. 
77Maistry v The BBC [2011] ET 1213142/2010 at para 17.  
78R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parteWilliamson[2005] UKHL 15 at  
para 23.  
79Grainger PLC v Nicholson [2009] UKEAT 0219/09/ZT (3 November 2009) at para 28.  
80Mackereth v The Department for Work and Pensions &Ors [2019]ET 1304602/2018. 
81Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors [2019] ET 2200909/2019.  
82Mackereth v The Department for Work and Pensions &Ors [2019]ET 1304602/2018 at para 197. 
83 Though in a ‘footnote’ to the judgment it was stressed that: ‘It is important given the public interest in this 
case that we make clear this case did not concern whether Dr Mackereth is a Christian and if that qualifies for 
protection under the Equality Act. That was never in dispute’ (para 261).  
84Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 84.  
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Tayler concluded that the ‘claimant’s view, in its absolutist nature, is incompatible with 
human dignity and fundamental rights of others’ since it denied ‘the right of a person with a 
Gender Recognition Certificate to be the sex to which they have transitioned’. This test was 
the ground upon which the claimant lost. It is difficult to disagree with Hambler’s conclusion 
that the emphasis upon the ‘absolutist’ nature of the belief is misplaced in that this flies 
against the other tests under Grainger.85  Equally compelling is Hambler’s argument that this 
is a misinterpretation of the fifth test on the grounds that it ‘seems to conflate the notion of 
harassment, as understood under discrimination law, with incompatibility with human dignity 
(under Grainger)’ and does this without any authority.86If they are correctly decided, 
Mackereth87and Forstater88suggest that balancing of competing rights is a consideration 
under the fifth test.   It would appear that a belief that leads the claimant not to respect the 
law would fail under the fifth test.  It would seem, however, that this controversy would be 
unlikely to affect any claim concerning a belief in the NHS.  It is difficult to conceive of a 
situation where a belief in protecting the NHS would fail this faith requirement. 
 
Conclusion 
Whether a claim that forcing the claimant out of lockdown discriminates against them on 
grounds of their belief in the NHS would be successful in a tribunal would depend upon the 
evidence adduced including how the claimant had been disadvantaged. This comment, 
however, has suggested that the current state of the case law concerning the Grainger tests 
shows that such an argument is capable of being made and falling for protection under the 
Equality Act 2010. If ‘BBC values’ can be protected, as Maistry89 confirmed, then a belief in 
NHS values could also be protected. If a belief in Scottish independence falls under the 
Equality Act, as McEleny90confirmed, then a belief in the need to protect and maintain a 
public health service will also qualify. This would raise a further interesting potential 
scenario. Given that in such a claim some consideration is bound to be afforded to Article 9 
considerations, there would need to be discussion of Article 9(2) which states that freedom to 
 
85 He noted that ironically ‘Judge Tayler took something of an “absolutist” view of the issue himself: A 
Hambler, ‘Beliefs Unworthy of Respect in a Democratic Society: A View from the Employment Tribunal’ 
(2020) 22 (2) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 234, 239. 
86 Ibid 240.  
87Mackereth v The Department for Work and Pensions &Ors [2019]ET 1304602/2018. 
88Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors [2019] ET 2200909/2019.  
89Maistry v BBC [2014] EWCA Civ 1116 at para 2. 
90McEleny v Ministry of Defence (Scotland : Disability Discrimination, Religion or Belief Discrimination) 
[2018] UKET 4105347/2017 
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manifest one’s religion or belief can be subject to limitations that are necessary in the 
interests of, inter alia, public health.  
 
This comment has also highlighted how inconsistent the case law on the definition of belief 
under the Equality Act 2010 is. Many of the tests are not only elastic in nature but have 
forced tribunals to reach binary judgments that are inappropriate in relation to genuinely held 
convictions. And these judgments are sometimes made by reference to the tribunal’s 
supposedly objective determination of the worth of the belief rather than focusing on what it 
means to the claimant. That ought to be the test. It is ironic that while Grainger said that the 
ECHR case law was relevant and used this to fashion the tests, the interpretation of the 
Grainger tests has sometimes strayed far from a human rights approach.  The NHS may well 
be a religion – sociologically, theologically, philosophically and even potentially legally – but 
it is also true that the law on the definition of belief itself needs to be nursed back to health.   
 
 
 
 
 
